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Abstract
I combine an infinite-horizon version of Ben-Porath’s (1967) model
of human-capital accumulation with a vintage structure as in Chari &
Hopenhayn (1991). Different skill levels inside a vintage are comple-
mentary in production. Vintage-specific human capital is accumulated
based on workers’ optimal strategies and is lost when the technology
is phased out by an endogenous firm decision. I establish equivalence
between competitive equilibrium and a planner’s problem. It is shown
that returns to skill are highest in young vintages. Accelerated tech-
nological change shortens the life cycle of a technology and speeds
up obsolescence; the premium on tenure rises because more workers
are concentrated in young technologies with high skill premia. A cal-
ibration exercise comparing two steady states shows that the model
quantitatively accounts for the changes in the experience premium,
earnings dispersion and earnings turbulence in German data.
Keywords: Vintage human capital, age-earnings profiles, partial differential
equations
JEL codes: J01, E24, C63
1 Introduction
The neo-classical model of human-capital accumulation (Ben-Porath, 1967)
is very successful in modeling the structure of age-earnings profile in the
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cross section.1 However, there have been prominent changes in age-earnings
profiles in industrialized countries over the past decades (see Gottschalk &
Smeeding, 1997, for a review). This paper will argue that the neo-classical
framework fails to provide a coherent theory for these changes and provides
an alternative explanation based upon the notion of vintage-specific human
capital.
In a companion paper (Kredler, 2008), I document the changes in age-
earnings profiles for the case of Germany in the years 1975-2001 in the IAB
Employment Sample at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), a
large administrative data set of German workers provided by the German
Federal Employment Agency (BA). The following two trends are highlighted:
First, the experience premium (defined as the difference in median earnings
between workers in their 40s and workers in their 20s) has increased from
13 to 33 log points over the sample period; similar (or higher) numbers
are found when restricting the sample to educational subgroups. Second,
earnings turbulence (the variance in the growth rate of individual workers’
earnings) and earnings dispersion (the cross-sectional variance in earnings)
have increased in lockstep with a rising mobility of workers between jobs.2 In
a linearized version of a Ben-Porath-type model, Kredler (2008) shows that
implausibly high changes in parameters are necessary to reconcile the neo-
classical human-capital theory with the observed increase in the experience
premium.
Models like Huggett et al.’s (2006), which enriches Ben-Porath’s model
with individual-specific learning ability and shocks to human capital, are
most likely to inherit these properties. There is a better chance to match
the observed hike in the experience premium for frameworks in which human
capital comes in different types; these different types can command different
experience premia, and the composition of types in the population may
change over time. Guvenen & Kuruscu’s (2007) model, for example, is
in this vein. Indeed, their model generates an increase in the experience
premium over recent decades. This rise is driven by an exogenous change
in the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between raw labor
and skilled labor, skilled labor being analogous to human capital in the
Ben-Porath framework.
The model that I propose differs from Guvenen & Kuruscu’s (2007) in
the following respects: First, it generates a rise in the experience premium
1Recent examples include Guvenen & Kuruscu (2007) and Huggett, Ventura & Yaron
(2006).
2See the boxplots in figures 5 and 6 for a quick overview of the changes in the cross-
sectional distribution of earnings and earnings growth rates by age in Germany.
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without changing the MRTS between skilled and unskilled in production,
relying solely upon the endogenous forces of skill accumulation by workers
and technology choice by firms. Second, it does so in a way that is inti-
mately linked to technological progress and earnings turbulence; it thus has
predictions on a richer set of observables.
An entirely different class of models that are able to generate tenure-
related gains in earnings are search models. Burdett & Coles (2003) show in
such a setting that firms optimally offer increasing wage schedules in order to
prevent costly turnover. The predictions of the model presented here differ in
the following ways from Burdett & Coles’s (2003): First, in Burdett & Coles
(2003) changes in employer are vital for the determination of wage profiles,
whereas in my setting, changes in the technology a worker is employed in
are crucial. Second, Burdett & Coles (2003) predict that workers’ wage
profiles never cross; in my setting, this crossing (often termed “overtaking”
in the literature) is necessary to make workers indifferent between entering
different technologies.
In modeling the environment, I depart from the observation that de-
velopments similar to those in Germany have occurred in most other in-
dustrialized countries. In a survey of labor-market studies conducted in the
1990s, Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997) and Gottschalk & Joyce (1998) report
that the experience premium had increased in six countries over the 1980s,
remained constant in one and that the evidence was inconclusive in three
countries.3 They also cite evidence that earnings dispersion has increased
in almost all countries.
Led by the observation that the empirical phenomena found in the Ger-
man data are shared by many other countries, I seek a technological expla-
nation to account for the changes in age-earnings profiles. Specifically, this
paper shows that an acceleration in the pace of technological progress –as has
been measured over the last decades by Cummins & Violante (2002) based
upon work by Gordon (1990)– can generate a steepening of age-earnings
profiles alongside an increase in dispersion and turbulence.4
3Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997) cite a study according to which the experience premium
did not increase in Germany; since the sample period of this study is far shorter than the
one considered in my data, I discard this study from the above count. For the U.S., the
evidence on these phenomena is mixed: There is a consensus in the literature that earnings
dispersion has increased over recent decades, but for the experience premium the case is
less clear. Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997) find an increase in the experience premium, but
studies like Heckman, Lochner & Todd (2003) find no important changes over the last
decades.
4Violante (2002) shows that accelerated technological change can lead to an increase
in residual earnings dispersion when human capital is vintage-specific. However, in his
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I augment the neo-classical model of human-capital accumulation with
a vintage structure as in Chari & Hopenhayn (1991). Human capital is tied
to a technology and is lost when the technology is phased out. Unlike in
Chari & Hopenhayn’s (1991) model, human-capital accumulation is endoge-
nous and the possibly infinite lives of individuals allow for rich patterns in
age-earnings profiles. In each vintage, different levels of human capital are
complementary inputs to a production function. I show equivalence between
the market equilibrium and the planner’s solution, which implies uniqueness
of equilibrium.
In the model, the premium on technology-specific skills is highest in
young technologies. This result is driven by the relatively larger scarcity
of skill in young technologies. As technologies age, this premium shrinks
and eventually vanishes entirely.5 When the speed of technological progress
increases, firms switch to the frontier vintage faster. More workers are then
employed in new technologies with a high experience premium, which in-
creases the average experience premium. Also, workers lose vintage-specific
human capital more often, which induces higher turbulence and dispersion
in earnings profiles.
I prove that faster churning of technologies (which occurs in the wake of a
technological acceleration) can be accompanied by a hike in the experience
premium only if high- and low-human-capital inputs are complementary
in production. Under substitutability, in fact, the shortened life span of a
technology decreases incentives for human-capital accumulation and flattens
the productivity- and thus the age-earnings profiles.
The model’s parameters are calibrated to match key moments in the
German data. A comparison between two steady states shows that the
model can quantitatively account for the secular changes in age-earnings
profiles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the model and analyzes the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 shows that
the model’s equilibrium is equivalent to the solution of a planner’s problem.
Section 4 presents the calibration results. Section 5 concludes and discusses
potential further applications of the framework.
framework human-capital accumulation follows a learning curve and is thus exogenous.
5The continuous-time setting allows me to prove that the wage structure in the last
vintage is completely flat.
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2 Model
2.1 Technology
Time is continuous. In every instant s, a new production technology (or
vintage) arrives that is available to the agents in the economy for all t ≥ s.
I will either refer to the vintages by their birth date s or –especially in a
stationary setting– identify them by their age τ ≡ t−s. All vintages produce
the same good y.
The production technology s uses labor inputs that are specific to this
technology. The inputs are arranged on a hierarchy and indexed by 0 ≤ h ≤
1. The inputs on this ladder can be thought of as tasks that are increasing
in difficulty; tasks with a higher index require more vintage-specific human
capital. Section 2.2 will specify exactly how this form of human capital is
accumulated by workers.
The production function is supposed to capture the following notions:
Newer vintages are more productive holding input ratios equal and the pro-
duction function is complementary in its inputs. Specifically, I impose
Y (t, s) = eγsY˜
[
n(t, s, ·)
]
where n(t, s, h) is the density function of workers at time t in vintage s with
human capital h and Y˜ is a functional on the space of C1 functions on [0, 1]
with the following properties:
• Constant returns to scale (CRS): Y˜ (λn) = λY˜ (n).
• The Frechet derivative w˜[n] exists everywhere, is continuous in n and
w˜[n](h) > 0 for all h, n
• Weak concavity: Y˜
[
λn + (1 − λ)n′
]
≥ λY˜ [n] + (1 − λ)Y˜ [n′] for all
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
The first two properties imply that in a competitive setting, total wage
payments exhaust production. An example for such a functional is the
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregator
Y˜CES[n(t, s, ·)] =
[∫ 1
0
f(h)n(t, s, h)ρdh,
]1/ρ
, (1)
where ρ ≤ 1 and f(h) ≥ 0. Total output in the economy at time t is given
by Y (t) =
∫ t
−∞
Y (t, s)ds.
At times, I will additionally invoke the following Inada condition:
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Definition 2.1. (Inada condition) The production function is said to fulfill
an Inada condition if n(h)→ 0 implies w˜(h)→∞ for all h ∈ [0, 1] and there
is a unique element n∗ on the interior of the unit simplex ∆ = {n :
∫
h n = 1}
that maximizes output at y¯ ≡ maxn∈∆ Y˜ (n).
Optimality of n∗ implies that marginal factor returns must be equalized
and we have a constant wage schedule w˜(n∗) = y¯. The CES aggregator
in (1) above fulfills the Inada condition if and only if ρ < 1.
Competitive firms take wages for all labor inputs as given in each in-
stant. Since the production technology is CRS, profits are zero for any t
and s in equilibrium. Workers are paid their marginal product w(t, s, h) =
eγsw˜(h)[n(t, s, ·)].
2.2 Workers
There is a continuum of agents that has mass one. Agents die at a constant
rate δ. New agents are born at the same rate δ, keeping total population
constant.
Agents have linear utility and discount the future at rate β, where β +
δ > γ. Each agent chooses a work life {s(t), h(t)}0≤t<∞, which consists
of a function s(t) specifying the vintage the agent works for all t and a
function h(t) specifying the task he performs at t in vintage s(t). It is
required that the vintage already exist at time t, i.e. s(t) ≤ t, and that s(t)
be a measurable function in t.6
As for human-capital accumulation h(t), I require that a worker start
her work life in position h = 0 when she enters the vintage; mathematically
I impose that h(t¯) > 0 only if there is an interval (a, b) around t¯ such that
s(t) = t¯ for all a < t¯ < b.7 There is no cost of switching between vintages.
I will refer to a career segment l′(t) (or short career) as the maximal open
interval (l′0(t), l
′
1(t)) around an instant t that is entirely spent in one vintage.
8
If l′0(t) = t = l
′
1(t), the career segment as an open interval is empty and
we will not call this degenerate stay in a vintage a career segment. Since
6This specification allows for lives with more than countably many vintage changes; a
relevant example for such a life is s(t) = t.
7This also means that a worker has to start at zero again even if he had worked in that
vintage before but quit it at some point. This assumption is imposed for tractability and
may be relaxed; in equilibrium, workers would not want to return to vintages they have
once left.
8Formally, define the end points as l′0(t) ≡ inf{a ≤ t : s(u) = s(t) ∀u ∈ [a, t]} and
l′1(t) = sup{b ≥ t : s(u) = s(t) ∀u ∈ [t, b]}.
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segments are open intervals and each of them contains a rational number,
there can only be countably many of them in an agent’s life.
To capture the notion that human-capital accumulation inside a vintage
is costly, I require that the function h be differentiable on all segments and
assume that the worker has to pay a flow cost eγs(t)c[h˙(t)] on segments,
where and h˙ denotes the time derivative of h and c is a function with the
following properties:9
• Costless demotion: c[h˙] = 0 if h˙ ≤ 0.
• Convexity: c′(h˙) is a continuous, strictly increasing function on (0,∞).
• Jumps prohibitively expensive: lim∆t→∞ c[∆h/∆t]∆t =∞
The last two assumptions imply limh˙→∞ c
′(h˙) = ∞. An example that sat-
isfies these properties is c(h˙) = c¯max{h˙, 0}2/2. No costs accrue for non-
segments; observe that for any t that is not on a segment, we must have
h(t) = 0.
Each agent born at t = 0 enters the economy with some experience
level h0 for a vintage of age s0 ≤ 0, i.e. the first segment may start off
with h0 ≥ h(0) > 0 if s(0) = s0. There is a density n0(τ, h) over these
endowments at t = 0. New-born workers enter with h(t) = 0 for all t > 0.
To summarize, the agent’s criterion for a given life lu is
v(lu) =
∫ ∞
u
e−(β+δ)(t−u)
[
w
(
t, su(t), hu(t)
)
− eγsu(t)c
[
h˙u(t)
]]
dt,
where it is understood that h˙ = 0 on non-segments and u ≥ 0 indicates the
agent’s birth date. The value function is defined as V (t, s, h) = suplt(t)=(s,h) v(lt).
Since discounting is exponential, optimal policies are time-consistent and
V (t, s, h) also gives us the forward-looking value for any agent born before t
who finds herself in position (s, h) at t.
9The cost of human-capital accumulation is growing at the pace of total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) to ensure stationarity of the economy. This specification entails that
the costs of human-capital accumulation relative to productivity in a technology do not
change. This is in line with models where workers have to set aside time from productive
work in order to accumulate human capital; in such a setting, the opportunity cost of
human-capital accumulation is given by the marginal productivity of devoting one’s time
to productive work instead of learning. The specification here is a modeling shortcut that
avoids putting hours into the model.
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2.3 Stationary equilibrium
I will limit the discussion to densities n which have a collection of neigh-
borhoods in X ≡ [0,∞) × [0,∞) × [0, 1] as their support Sn and which are
continuous and differentiable on these neighborhoods.10
For a stationary environment, I require that n(t, s, h) depend only on
the age of the vintage τ = t− s, but not on time:
n(t, s, h) = n(s+ τ, s, h) = n¯(τ, h).
Stationarity immediately implies that wages and production grow at rate γ,
i.e. w(t, s, h) = eγtw¯(τ, h), Y (t, s) = eγtY¯ (τ) and Y (t) = eγtY¯ . By sta-
tionarity of the cost functional, also the value function grows at this rate:
V (t, s, h) = eγtV¯ (τ, h). From now on, we will only work with the stationary
distribution; I thus drop the bar-notation and write simplify n(τ, h), w(τ, h)
and so forth.
Definition 2.2. A stationary competitive equilibrium is a stationary density
n(τ, h), a measure µ on all possible work lives l(t) = {τ(t), h(t)} and a wage
function w(τ, h) that is continuous on the interior of X such that
• Compatibility of µ and n: For all Borel sets B in R2 and for all t,11∫
B
e−δ(t−u)I
[(
τu(t), hu(t)
)
∈ B
]
dµ(l) =
∫
B
n(τ, h),
• Optimal labor demand: n(τ, ·) = argmaxn
{
Y [n]−
∫
w(τ, h)n(h)dh
}
∀τ
• Optimal labor supply: Any set A over lives such that lu ∈ A implies
v(lu) < e
γuV (τu(u), hu(u)) has measure zero under µ.
2.4 Properties of equilibrium
We will be looking for a value function V ∈ C1(X) that is consistent with
a stationary equilibrium. I start to characterize the equilibrium by deriv-
ing some properties of the value function. Since workers can always drop
down arbitrarily fast in the hierarchy at zero cost and the value function is
continuous, we have:
10This specification allows for densities that drop precipitously down to zero when a
vintage dies — which is exactly what happens in equilibrium. Also, note that feasibility
requires that the neighborhoods be connected to points with h = 0 or t = 0.
11The subscript lu again refers to an agent born at u ≥ .0. The simple multiplication of
the indicator function by the survival function e−δ(t−u) is valid since death is independent
of workers’ strategies.
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Lemma 2.1. (Value function weakly increasing in h) The value function
V (τ, h) is weakly increasing in h for all fixed τ .
Also, workers always have the option to start a new career immediately.
So in any position, they must always at least as well off as workers who start
an optimal career.
Definition 2.3. Define the maximal value that can be attained by a career
starter as W = maxτ V (τ, 0).
Lemma 2.2. (Value equal for all career starters) We have V (τ, 0) = W for
all τ and V (τ, h) ≥W for all (τ, h).
We will now turn to characterizing the support of the equilibrium den-
sity Sn. First, observe that the Inada condition ensures that all rungs in the
skill hierarchy must be filled if a vintage is in production:
Lemma 2.3. (All jobs filled in producing vintage) If the Inada condition 2.1
holds, then Y (τ) > 0 implies (τ, h) ∈ S¯n.
12
This is a consequence of promotion costs being bounded for any position
with τ > 0 but wages going to infinity for empty slots in the skill ladder. A
formal proof is given in appendix A.1.2.
Another result that allows us to make some headway is that we do not
have to consider the entire space of vintages 0 ≤ τ < ∞, but can restrict
ourselves to a finite interval 0 ≤ τ ≤ T :
Lemma 2.4. (Finite support of technologies) There is T < ∞ such that∫ 1
0 n(τ, h)dh = 0 for all τ > T .
The proof uses the argument that workers can always secure some pos-
itive wage in a frontier vintage without going through training, but that
old vintages’ productivity goes to zero relative to the frontier. The result is
ultimately driven by the the fact that returns to learning are bounded but
growth of TFP is not.
Proof. Since there exists τ such that w(τ, 0) > 0, there is a strictly positive
flow value ε > 0 that a worker can secure by working continuously in (τ, 0).
Now, we will argue that in very old vintages, this value cannot be provided
to workers since TFP eventually goes below any positive bound.
Now, fix some old vintage S. Note that in equilibrium, the value of every
career segment l′ (which may be of finite or infinite length, and where we cut
12A¯ denotes the closure of a set A.
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off parts in vintages younger than S) spent in vintages above S must exceed
the value of working for ε — if not, the worker should certainly replace the
segment by ǫ:
v˜(l′) ≡
∫ l1
l0
e(γ−β−δ)tw(t− s′(t), h′(t))dt ≥
∫ l1
l0
e(γ−β−δ)tǫdt
The inequality must hold since since l′ also includes non-negative human-
capital-accumulation costs.
Now, observe that the value of all discounted career segments in vintages
older than S has to be lower than total discounted wages and thus production
in those vintages. Integrate the above inequality over all career segments of
type l′ in the economy:∫
all l′
v˜(l′) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e(γ−β−δ)t
∫ t−S
−∞
∫ 1
0
n(t, s, h)w(t, s, h)dhdsdt ≤
≤ y¯e−γS
∫ ∞
0
e(γ−β−δ)t
(∫
s,h
n(t, s, h)
)
dt,
where in the last step I used that the upper bound on production for vintages
even older than S is at most e−γS y¯ for some y¯ < ∞, see lemma A.1) for a
proof.
On the other hand, we know that each agent must weakly prefer working
in an old vintage to working for ǫ — again, integrating up over all segments
we get: ∫
all l′
v˜(l′) ≥ ǫ
∫
e(γ−β−δ)t
(∫
s,h
n(t, s, h)
)
dt
But combining the above inequalities yields a contradiction: By choosing S
large enough, we can make e−γS y¯ < ǫ, making it impossible that very old
vintages provide enough value to be attractive to workers.
Definition 2.4. Define the last vintage in production by T ∗ ≡ infτ{τ :∫ 1
0 n(τ, h)dh = 0} Note that T
∗ <∞ is ensured by lemma 2.4.
In order to further characterize Sn, it will be useful to know something
about the wage structure in the oldest technology. Consider the problem
of a worker who optimizes his career with respect to the switching point t¯
when he quits a vintage:
max
t¯
∫ t¯
0
e−(β+δ−γ)tw[τ(t), h(t)]dt + e−(β+δ−γ)t¯W
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Since w is continuous, differentiating with respect to τ yields that t¯ can only
be optimal if w[τ(t), h(t)] = (β + δ − γ)W , where the right-hand side is the
flow value of starting a new career. If the wage was still higher than that,
the worker should stay in the vintage at least a bit more; if it was lower,
quitting a bit earlier would make him better off. We summarize:
Lemma 2.5. (Final career wage) For the end of any career segment l0,
it must be that wages tend to the flow value of starting a new career, i.e.
limt→l1 w[τ(t), h(t)] = (β + δ − γ)W .
Corollary 2.6. (Flat wage structure in oldest technology) For all (T ∗, h) ∈
Sn, we have w(T
∗, h) = (β+ δ− γ)W . If the Inada condition 2.1 holds, this
implies that vintages attain maximal productivity upon their death.
For vintages τ > T ∗ that are out of production, the equilibrium defini-
tion 2.3 requires us to specify a wage structure that makes it undesirable
for both workers and firms to use those vintages. There are many possible
choices for w in this region; one possible choice is w(τ, h) = e−γ(t−T
∗)/2w(T ∗, 0).
Workers will strictly prefer W to any career behind T ∗, and firms would not
break even for τ > T ∗ even at optimal factor ratios since TFP decays faster
with τ than the wage bill does. Also, continuity of w is ensured as required.
Reasoning along these lines shows that there cannot be any holes in the
support of n along the τ -direction:
Lemma 2.7. (No holes in vintage space) Suppose the Inada condition 2.1
holds. Then, if both Y (τ0) > 0 and Y (τ1) > 0, also Y (τ) > 0 for all
τ0 < τ < τ1.
This of course implies that all these in-between vintages τ have points
(τ, h) ∈ Sn.
Proof. Suppose there was some τ ′ ∈ (τ0, τ1) for which Y (τ
′) = 0. Then
there must be a positive measure of career segments ending on [τ0, τ
′) and
the final wages of these segments must be equalized, which implies that all
agents leave the vintage at once for some τe = sup{τ : Y (τ > 0)} and that
w(τe, h) = e
−γτe y¯ = (β + δ − γ)W for all h. But this contradicts the fact
that w(T ∗, h) = e−γT
∗
y¯ = (β + δ − γ)W since T ∗ ≥ τ1 > τ
′.
Lemma 2.7 together with 2.3 shows that the closure of the support of n
must be a rectangle [T0, T
∗] × [0, 1] if the Inada condition 2.1 holds. Sec-
tion 2.5 shows that there cannot be holes in the τ -direction either when
labor inputs are perfect substitutes. Arguments in sections 2.5 and 2.11 will
then show that we must of course have T0 = 0.
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We will now seek a further characterization of the equilibrium studying
the worker’s behavior on career segments. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation (HJB) for an interior point of a career segment is the following
first-order partial differential equation (PDE):
−Vτ (τ, h) = w(τ, h) − (β + δ − γ)V (τ, h) + max
h˙
{
−c[h˙] + h˙Vh(τ, h)
}
(2)
where the partial derivatives Vτ and Vh are denoted by subscripts. The
equation says the following: If we know the value function for a given τ for
all experience levels h, we can get the value a bit left of this τ by letting the
agent choose the optimal slope h˙. This slope is contingent on the slope of the
value function and the cost of learning. The change in the value function
a small step to the left (keeping h fixed) is the gain the agent gets from
moving up in the hierarchy (the term inside the max-operator) and another
term which is the difference between the current wages and the flow value of
V (τ, h) under the discount factor β + δ − γ, which is modified for economic
growth.
The first-order condition (FOC) corresponding to the HJB (2) is
c′
[
h˙(τ, h)
]
= Vh(τ, h), (3)
where a unique solution for h˙ is assured by the assumptions on c when-
ever Vh > 0. Since c is convex, the FOC implies that the greater the
value differentials in the hierarchy, the faster is human-capital accumula-
tion. Given the boundary condition V (T ∗, h) = W for all h, equations (2)
and (3) together determine the optimal policies of an agent who takes the
wage function w as given. It is worthwhile noting that the Hamiltonian
(the term comprised in the max-operator) in the HJB (2), is the Legendre
transform of c(·) and hence a convex function in Vh. This implies that the
HJB will usually be non-linear in Vh.
13
Sometimes, it will be convenient to work with the Euler equation, which
tells us how the marginal value of human capital Vh changes along a career.
Differentiate (2) with respect to h and use the envelope condition (3) to
obtain
dVh
dt
= h˙(Vh)h + (Vh)τ = (β + δ − γ)Vh − wh, (4)
where I have parameterized an agent’s career in time by dτ = dt and dh =
h˙dt and the dependence of the various functions on (τ, h) is suppressed for
the sake of clarity. We can solve this as an ordinary differential equation
13For example, the Hamiltonian equals V 2h /2c¯ in the quadratic case.
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in t along an agent’s optimal career path to see that the marginal value of
human capital equals the discounted integral of marginal wage gains over a
career:
Vh(t) =
∫ T
t
e−(β+δ−γ)(u−t)wh[τ(u), h(u)]du, (5)
where T is the end of the career segment and it is clear that Vh(T, h) = 0
since V (T, h) = W for all h, i.e. the value of learning is zero at the end of a
career. This suggests that the incentives for human-capital accumulation are
strongest in the beginning of a career and thus human-capital accumulation
should be decreasing over segments.
I now proceed to characterize how the density n(τ, h) evolves given the
optimal local behavior of agents given in (3). Inside Sn, n must obey the
following PDE:
nτ (τ, h) + h˙(τ, h)nh(τ, h) = −
[
δ + h˙h(τ, h)
]
n(τ, h), (6)
where the notation h˙h =
∂h˙
∂h is used. This PDE says that when one fol-
lows the path of an agent, the density thins out at the death rate plus the
divergence of the promotion policies h˙h inside the hierarchy. Section 3.1 con-
tains a derivation of this equation.14 For a given boundary condition n(τ, 0)
on τ ∈ [T0, T
∗], we may solve this PDE through the support of n to obtain
the density everywhere.
To summarize, he HJB (2) with its boundary conditions characterizes
workers’ optimal strategies given wages. Equation (6) tells us how the re-
sulting decisions by workers from (3) translate into a density n once we know
how new-borns enter vintages.15 Optimality of firms’ decisions implies that
wages w on the support of n are given by the Frechet derivative of Y (τ)
with respect to n(τ, ·). Wages w then feed back again into workers’ HJB.
2.5 Subcase: Perfect substitutes
We will now turn our attention to the special case where different skill levels
are perfect substitutes. Take the CES-aggregator (1) with ρ = 1 as the
production function. Then, wages are given by w(τ, h) = e−γτf(h). We will
assume a standard learning curve and require that f ′(h) > 0 and f ′′(h) < 0.
14The equation is the usual mass-transport equation for densities in a deterministic
context; it may be seen as a special (non-stochastic) case of the Kolmogorov forward
equation.
15The entry density n(τ, 0) may be freely chosen if V (τ, 0) = 0 for all τ ∈ [T0, T
∗], i.e.
if workers are indifferent between all careers.
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In this case, the problem essentially reduces to one of partial equilibrium:
It is sufficient to solve a worker’s problem, let every worker follow her optimal
policy and collect the results in the equilibrium density n.16
A first result is that a worker will always choose to switch to the newest
vintage when she relocates:
Lemma 2.8. (Always enter newest vintage under substitutability) If Y˜ =
Y˜CES with ρ = 1, then for any optimal life h(t) = 0 ⇒ τ(t) = 0 at the
beginning of segments and τ(t) = 0 almost everywhere on non-segments.
Proof. Suppose the worker chose a career segment with s(t1) > t1 on t ∈
[t1, t2). Then this is strictly dominated by choosing the same career in
s(t1) = t1 and hence not optimal. Obviously, the same holds true for choos-
ing s(t) > t and h(t) = 0 on non-segments of positive measure.
We will now be concerned with how technological progress in the form
of a change in γ affects agents’ decisions. Using the solution to the Euler
equation in (5), we obtain
Vk(t) =
∫ T
t
e−(β+δ)(u−t)f ′[h(u)]du (7)
Since the wage gains from human-capital accumulation are decreasing in
h by the concavity assumption on f , this entails that workers in a lower
hierarchy position have stronger incentives to learn ceteris paribus. Another
consequence is that the h-profile will always steeper for worker with a longer
horizon. The following lemma (proven in appendix A.1.3) will be sufficient
to prove the formalizations of these insights:
Lemma 2.9. (Paths cross at most once) If Y˜ = Y˜CES with ρ = 1, then for
two optimal careers h(t) and g(t) we have:
h(t) ≥ g(t) and h˙(t) < g˙(t) ⇒ h(s) > g(s) for all s < t,
We will now study comparing optimal careers in worlds with different
values for technological growth γ with a view on the experience premium
that we would observe. Since equation (7) shows that technological growth is
inessential for the intertemporal incentives for human-capital accumulation
16Note that typically, all agents will follow the same path and thus n would be a measure
that cannot be represented by a density function. However, this is unproblematic since the
production function (1) and the PDE (6) still make sense, the former as a linear functional
and the latter in a weak sense.
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while inside a vintage, we can use the above lemma to compare optimal
careers for different values of γ. As the experience premium, we define the
ratio of the wage of an experience-t worker in a vintage to the wage of a
career starter, which in a stationary context is pγ(t) = e
−γtw[h(t)]/w[h(0)]
and where the optimal path h of course depends on γ.
Proposition 2.10. (Shorter horizon lowers experience premium) Again take
Y˜ = Y˜ with ρ = 1. Suppose that γ′ 6= γ but fix all other parameters. Then
T ∗
′
> T ∗ implies pγ′(t) > pγ(t) for any 0 < t ≤ T
∗.
Proof. Without loss of generality, take two career segments h and h′ in vin-
tage s = 0 starting with h′(0) = h(0) = 0 and T ∗
′
> T ∗. Now suppose that
h′(T ∗) ≤ h(T ∗). First, note that h˙(T ∗) = 0 but h˙′(T ∗) > 0 by equation (7)
and the fact that c′[h˙] = Vh. By lemma 2.9, the two paths cannot cross
again for any 0 ≤ t > T ∗. But this is a contradiction to h(0) = h′(0) = 0.
By the same argument, the two paths cannot intersect at any other point
0 < t < T ∗(γ). So we must have h′(t) ≥ h(t) and so w[h′(t)] ≥ w[h(t)],
which implies the desired result.
This result shows that it is impossible that the life span of technolo-
gies shortens –which I will refer to as the economy being more turbulent–
and simultaneously we see an increase in the experience premium, as has
arguably been the case in reality. Figure 1 illustrates the intuition for the
result: Workers with a shorter planning horizon in their technology have
fewer incentives to invest in technology-specific knowledge and thus increase
their productivity at a slower pace, leading to a lower experience premium.
The following sections will show that this result need not hold when
different human-capital levels are complementary in production and give
some intuition on how it can indeed be overturned.
2.6 Wage structure under complementarity
This section will further characterize the wage structure for the case where
labor inputs of different skill levels are complementary. I start with the
following observation:
Lemma 2.11. (Vintage T ∗ has highest entry wage) If the Inada condi-
tion 2.1 holds, then w(T ∗, 0) ≥ w(τ, 0) for all 0 ≤ τ < T ∗
Proof. By lemma 2.6, w(T ∗)/(β + δ − γ) = W , i.e. always working in
the oldest vintage as an unskilled worker is an optimal strategy. Suppose
15
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Figure 1: Horizon effect under substitutability
w(τ, 0) > w(T ∗, 0) for some τ . Then always working in position (τ, 0) would
give value (β + δ− γ)w(τ, 0) > W , which contradicts W being the maximal
attainable value for a career starter.
Intuitively, entry wages have to be lower in young technologies for the
following reason: Entering a new technology provides experience that will
be valuable in the future. So, barring any offsetting wage differential, all
workers would choose to enter new technologies. When labor inputs are
complementary, some workers are also needed in low-skill tasks in the oldest
technologies. In order for both entry options being equally attractive, entry
wages in young technologies have to be lower there than in old technologies.
It turns out that on the top of the skill hierarchy, the converse is true:
Lemma 2.12. (Wage explosion for skilled in young technologies) If the
Inada condition 2.1 holds, then limτ→0w(τ, 1) =∞ and Y (τ) > 0 for all τ ∈
(0, T ∗).
A proof is given in the appendix A.1. The intuition behind the result
is that people with high skills in very young technologies must have worked
very hard to acquire these under our assumptions on c(·). Thus, those
workers have to be compensated by very high wages. Note that this is
ensured if only very few people take such steep paths. When scarce enough
a factor, the skilled in young technologies earn outlandish returns by the
Inada condition.
Collecting the previous results yields:
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Corollary 2.13. (Wage Compression) The wage difference between high-
human-capital and low-human-capital workers is highest in the youngest vin-
tages and lowest in the oldest vintages, i.e. w(τ, 1)−w(τ, 0)→∞ as τ → 0
and w(τ, 1) − w(τ, 0)→ 0 as τ → T ∗.
Proof. The first statement follows from w(τ, 0) ≤ w(T ∗, 0) for all τ < T ∗
(see lemma 2.11) and w(ǫ, 1)→∞ (see lemma 2.12). The second statement
follows from lemma 2.13.
Intuitively, the wage structure is compressed because experience becomes
less scarce over the lifecycle of a vintage; it is easier to acquire skills over
a long time than to master a technology that was barely invented. Wage
compression under complementarity again opens the possibility that higher
turbulence (a shortening of the vintage horizon T ∗) can occur alongside an
increase in the experience premium — since the wage structure is steeper in
young technologies, a shortening of the vintage horizon can send more work-
ers into steep earnings paths, increasing the average experience premium.
Section 4 will present calibrations for which this is indeed the case.
Another consequence of the discussion above is the following:
Corollary 2.14. (Obsolescence/wage losses) There is a positive measure of
careers with dw[τ(t), h(t)]/dt < 0 for some t. Furthermore, agents who quit
their vintage start their new career with a wage weakly lower than their last
wage in the old career.
Proof. The first statement follows from the reasoning laid out in lemma 2.12:
There is a positive measure of agents with high human capital h ∈ [1− ǫ, 1]
in young vintages τ ∈ (0, ǫ] with a high wage w(τ, h) > M , M large, which
must experience wage losses once they leave the high-wage region. The
second statement is an obvious consequence of lemma 2.11 and 2.6.
This result is remarkable since these wage losses occur without assum-
ing that human capital depreciates — an assumption often invoked in Ben-
Porath-type models to obtain downward-bending wage profiles for old work-
ers. Agents do not lose any of their skills in the model presented here; the
reason for the wage losses is that the relative price for some skills falls over
time, a phenomenon which is usually referred to as obsolescence.
Also, note that the second type of wage loss, which stems from the loss of
vintage human capital due to a vintage change, is not due to an exogenous
shock here (an assumption sometimes made in human-capital models), but
stems from an endogenous decision. The worker accepts a temporary wage
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loss in order to obtain skills in a new technology which pay off later in his
work life.
3 The planner’s problem
This section shows that the competitive equilibrium characterized in the pre-
vious section is equivalent to the solution of the following planner’s problem.
Let the planner weigh the utility of an agent born at t with e−βt. Since it
costs the planner e−δ(u−t) units of output to supply one unit to each sur-
viving member of a cohort born at t and utility is linear for all agents, it is
easy to see that the planner’s criterion is then to choose a function n(t, s, h)
(which we require again to be C1 on a given support Sn) to maximize
J(n) =
∫ ∞
0
e−βt (Y [n(t; ·)] − C(t)) dt,
where C(t) denotes the aggregate cost of human-capital accumulation at t.
First, we will derive an expression for C(t) under the optimal strategy to
implement a given density n.
3.1 Optimal promotion strategy
It turns out that the optimal promotion strategy is such that agents’ ca-
reer paths inside a vintage never cross. A formal proof for this state-
ment, which builds on a discrete approximation technique, is given in ap-
pendix A.2.Intuitively, if a positive measure of agents crossed each other’s
way, then one could improve upon the strategy by maintaining the ordering
inside the vintage, making agents go shorter paths and hence lowering total
cost for the planner.
In the following, it will prove useful work with the anti-cdf N(t, s, h) ≡∫ 1
h n(t, s, h˜)dh˜. In a scheme where agents’ paths do not cross, this quantity
must decrease at the death rate δ when we evaluate it along an agent’s path
(always staying in a fixed vintage s). A first-order approximation following
a career line [h(t), τ(t)] yields:
Nt(t, s, h) + h˙(t, s, h)Nh(t, s, h) = −δN(t, s, h), (8)
where we note that Nh = −n. Taking the h-derivative of the above and
imposing stationarity yields the PDE for the evolution of n, which we already
saw for the competitive equilibrium in equation (6).
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Re-arranging equation (8) gives us an expression for the career slope h˙
the planner should choose given that she wants to implement a given n:
h˙(t, s, h) =
Nt(t, s, h) + δN(t, s, h)
n(t, s, h)
. (9)
In order to aggregate costs over all agents, we have to weigh the cost of h˙
at each point by the mass of agents at the respective point and obtain
C(t) =
∫
s,h n(t, s, h)c[h˙(t, s, h)].
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3.2 The planner’s first-order conditions
The strategy to obtain the first-order conditions (FOCs) for the planner’s
problem is as follows: I will first allow the planner to to choose any –possibly
time-varying– density n(t, s, h). I then look for stationary distribution which
solves this unrestricted problem. This ensures that the planner would not
want to deviate from the stationary density n(τ, h) although she could do
so. I will first restrict Sn to the entire rectangle below a maximal vintage
age T and then let T vary to find the optimal support T ∗.
It turns out that it is useful to introduce a variable u(t, s, h) ≡ nt(t, s, h)
into the problem and connect it to the functions n, N and Nt with equality
constraints. The Lagrangian is then the following object:18
L =
∫ ∞
0
e−βt
[∫ t
t−T
Y (t, s)− eγs
(∫ 1
0
c
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
n(t, s, h)dh
)
ds
]
dt+
+
∫
t,s,h
e−(β−γ)t
[
ν(t, s, h)
(
h˙−
N˙ + δN
n
)
+
+ λ(t, s, h)
(
n0(s, h) +
∫ t
0
u(t˜, s, h)dt˜− n(t, s, h)
)
+
+ η(t, s, h)
(
N˙(t, s, h)−
∫ 1
h
u(t, s, h˜)dh˜
)
+
+ ξ(t, s, h)
(
N(t, s, h) −
∫ 1
h
n(t, s, h˜)dh˜
)
+
+ µ(t)
(
1−
∫ t
t−T
∫ 1
0
n(t, s, h)dhds
)
dt
]
,
17This expression is derived in a more formal manner in Kredler (2008).
18See Luenberger (1973) for necessary conditions of constrained-optimization problems
in infinite-dimensional spaces.
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where we scale the Lagrange multipliers by e−(β−γ)t to make them stationary.
The set of constraints linked to the multipliers ν is taken from equation (9).
The constraints connected to µ enforce that total population not exceed the
bound 1. The rest of the constraints link the various variables related to the
density n.
The FOC with respect to N˙(t, s, h), h˙(t, s, h) and N(t, s, h) immediately
tell us that η equals the marginal cost of human-capital accumulation and
that ν and ξ are closely linked to η:
η(t, s, h) = e−γτ c′
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
(10)
ν(t, s, h) = e−γτ c′
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
n(t, s, h)
ξ(t, s, h) = δe−γτ c′
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
Using the above, the FOC with respect to n(t, s, h) is
λ(t, s, h) =w(t, s, h) − e−γτ c
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
+ e−γτ h˙(t, s, h)c′
[
h˙(t, s, h)
]
−
− µ(t)− δ
∫ h
0
η(t, s, h˜)dh˜. (11)
where we recognize in the terms involving c(·) the Hamiltonian in the value
function (2). The last remaining derivative we have to evaluate is the one
with respect to to u(t, s, x), which will prove crucial to obtain the PDE that
is equivalent to the HJB (2):∫ T
τ
e−(β−γ)(τ˜−τ)λ(τ˜ , h)dτ˜ =
∫ h
0
η(τ, h˜)dh˜ (12)
At a stationary solution, we require that the density fulfill n(t, s, h) =
n¯(τ, h), and as a consequence wages grow at rate γ: w(t, s, h) = eγtw¯(τ, h).
The Lagrange multipliers must also be time-independent, i.e. ν(t, s, h) =
ν¯(τ, h), µ(t) = µ¯ and so forth, where again we drop the bar-notation in the
following. When plugging the expressions for the Lagrange multipliers (10)
and (11) into (12) and imposing stationarity, we obtain∫ T
τ
e−(β−γ)(τ˜−τ)
[
w(τ˜ , h)− e−γτ˜ c
[
h˙(τ˜ , h)
]
+ h˙(τ˜ , h)c′
[
h˙(τ˜ , h)
]
− µ−
−δ
∫ h
0
η(τ˜ , h˜)dh˜
]
dτ˜ =
∫ h
0
e−γτ c′
[
h˙(τ, h˜)
]
dh˜ ≡ Λ(τ, h) (13)
We will now see that Λ(τ, h) is an “excess-value function”, i.e. it tells us
what the value of an agent to the planner in position (τ, h) is in excess of
the unconditional value µ of an additional untrained agent.
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Directly from (13), we can get the following insights: First, when τ → T ,
the left-hand side and with it the marginal cost of human-capital accumu-
lation c′[h˙] and hence h˙ itself go to zero. This says that one should not ac-
cumulate human capital anymore just before the vintage shuts down, which
also implies that w(T, h) must be weakly increasing in h by non-negativity
of the multipliers η. Second,when we let h→ 0, the right-hand side of (13)
goes to zero and we see that λ(τ, 0) = 0 for all τ . This says that for all entry
jobs the value function must be equalized. Third, when we let both τ → T
and h → 0 and use the insights from above, we obtain w(T, 0) = µ. This
says that w(T, 0) is the reference wage of the economy: It does not provide
any valuable experience, so it has to be just as attractive per se as any other
career (in flow terms).
Now, take the derivatives of Λ in (13) in both directions to see how this
excess-value function evolves on the interior:
Λh(τ, h) = e
−γτ c′
[
h˙(τ, h)
]
(14)
−Λτ (τ, h) = w(τ, h) − e
−γτ c
[
h˙
]
+ e−γτ h˙c′
[
h˙
]
− µ− (β + δ − γ)Λ(τ, h)
(15)
When adding the value W = µ/(β + δ − γ) for an agent at the start of a
career segment to Λ by defining V = Λ+W , we obtain
−Vτ (τ, h) = w(τ, h) − e
−γτ c(h˙) + h˙Vh − (β + δ − γ)V (τ, h) (16)
where we use Vh = Λh = c
′(h˙) and impose the boundary conditions V (τ, 0) =
V (T, h) = 0 for all τ , h. This is the same as the agent’s HJB (2) and
its boundary conditions in the decentralized solution. Subsection 3.5 will
discuss equivalence of the planner’s problem to the competitive equilibrium
more carefully; before, it is useful to analyze what happens when we vary T .
3.3 Uniqueness
A fundamental convexity argument allows us to establish uniqueness of the
planner’s solution:
Proposition 3.1. (Solution to planner’s problem is unique) If Y [nt,s(·)] is
strictly convex in nt,s(h)
19, J(n) is strictly convex in n and there is a unique
density n(t, s, h) that maximizes J(n)
19For the CES case, this is equivalent to assuming ρ < 1.
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Proof. Suppose there were two maximizers n1 and n2. Clearly, a convex
combination nλ = λn1 + (1− λ)n2 would also be feasible. Implementing nλ
in terms of promotion costs would be at least as cheap as implementing λn1
and (1−λ)n2 separately and adding up the costs. Output, however, will be
strictly larger for each fixed pair of t and s by the convexity assumption on
Y , which implies the desired result.
It is worthwhile to note that this argument does not hinge on the assump-
tion of n being continuous or differentiable, nor on any restriction on Sn. If
Y is not strictly convex, matters are slightly more complicated. Take the
example from subsection 2.5 with a linear production function: Uniqueness
of the planner’s problem depends on uniqueness of the partial-equilibrium
solution for the agent. If the agent’s problem has a unique solution for any
starting value of h, then the solution to the planner’s problem is unique.
Existence of equilibrium does not seem to be a problem computationally,
but could not be established formally without making an equicontinuity
assumption on the function space for n.20
3.4 Varying T
So far, we had fixed the maximal vintage age T and imposed this on the
planner; we will now be concerned with varying T and finding the opti-
mal T ∗ when Y˜ is strictly convex. By the fundamental convexity argument
in lemma 3.1, there is at most one T for which the planner’s criterion is max-
imized. An argument analogous to the proof for 2.4 shows that T ∗ <∞.
The first point to note is that for T > T ∗, the problem will usually
not have a maximand in the space of continuous differentiable functions.
To see this, suppose there was such a maximand n∗(T ). Since J [n∗(T ∗)] >
20In order to reap the benefits of compactness, we can seek a maximand n in the
planner’s problem that satisfies the following conditions: We re-parameterize the density
from n(t, s, h) to n(t, τ, h), which ensures that nt → 0 everywhere for any n that converges
to a stationary distribution. Then, compactify the t-dimension using an increasing concave
transform that maps [0,∞) → [0, 1) and define limt→∞ n(t, τ, h) as n˜(1, ·). We then
impose a Lipschitz condition uniformly on the entire family of n˜ in which we look for
a maximand (This essentially means that the modulus of continuity for the original n
becomes always stricter in the t-direction as t increases.). If we further assume that n
is pointwise bounded –which is unproblematic–, equicontinuity allows us to employ the
Arzela-Ascoli theorem which says that such a family of functions n˜ is a compact set; see
Rudin (1973) for a statement of the theorem. The computational exercises indicate that
indeed the optimizer n∗ satisfies a Lipschitz condition; decreasing the grid size to allow
for always steeper functions n does not significantly alter the solution after some point.
However, it is hard to prove that the solution really satisfies such a Lipschitz condition.
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J [n∗(T )], by convexity also J [nλ] > J [n
∗(T )] where we define nλ = λn
∗(T ∗)+
(1 − λ)n∗(T ) for any λ ∈ (0, 1). In turn, any nλ may be approximated ar-
bitrarily well by any continuous, differentiable n with support until T . So
there is a sequence of densities for which J converges to the global opti-
mum, but the global optimum is not in the space we are considering since
its support only extends to T ∗ < T and may be discontinuous at this point.
The second point to note is that for T < T ∗, simulations show that
usually the wage structure is not flat in the last vintage yet. In this case,
an argument along the lines of lemma 2.6 shows that it is preferable for the
planner to extend the vintage horizon T marginally; marginal productivi-
ties for different h-levels are not aligned yet and there is room for further
improvement through human-capital accumulation. It is hard to formally
show, though, that this must be the case.
3.5 Equivalence to competitive equilibrium
The following proposition establishes that the global solution to the plan-
ner’s problem is a competitive equilibrium and a partial converse of this
statement:
Proposition 3.2. (Equivalence of planner’s solution and competitive equi-
librium) The stationary (global) solution to the planner’s problem with T ∗
is a competitive equilibrium (CE). Any stationary CE is also a solution to
a planner’s problem for some T ≤ T ∗. There is no CE with T > T ∗.
Proof. I will first show that the global solution to the planner’s problem
constitutes a CE. Set wages w(τ, h) = ∂Y (τ)/∂n(τ, h) for τ ≤ T ∗ and
w(τ, h) = w(T ∗, 0) = µ for all τ > T ∗, all h. This implies that firms
optimally choose not to produce for τ > T ∗ since even the cost-minimizing
input combination leads to losses. For τ ≤ T ∗, n(τ, h) is an optimal input
choice and profits are zero. For agents, the HJB (16) and its boundary
conditions imply that any career segment which fulfills h˙ = Vh everywhere
is an optimal strategy with starting value µ. This weakly dominates any
career segment in vintages (T ∗,∞). One may then insert agents into careers
to engineer the entry density n(τ, 0) since agents are indifferent between all
careers. Equation (6) ensures that the density n reproduces itself given the
optimal decisions of agents.
Second, I prove that any CE is a solution to the planner’s problem for
some T ≤ T ∗. To start, note that the HJB for the agent (2) and the cor-
responding optimal policy (3) in competitive equilibrium have their exact
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counterparts in equations (16) and (15) for the planner’s problem. Equa-
tion (13) follows by integrating from the boundary over τ and h, which in
turn is equivalent to (12). Since the first-order conditions (10) and (11) can
be used to define the Lagrange multipliers, equation (12) already ensures
that all first-order conditions for the Lagrangian hold for any competitive
equilibrium.
This means that any competitive equilibrium is a stationary point of the
Lagrangian.21 However, there can be at most one stationary point for a
given T since J is a convex function and the set of permissible n is convex.
Hence this stationary point must be the global maximum of the planner’s
problem corresponding to the T induced by the respective CE. As the dis-
cussion in 3.4 showed, no such maximizer exists for T > T ∗, which means
that there cannot be any CE with T > T ∗.
It is hard to formally rule out competitive equilibria with T < T ∗. If
there is such a CE, then it must be that µT > µT ∗ since these multipliers
equal wages in the last vintage. This seems to suggest that JT > JT ∗ , which
would be a contradiction to T ∗ being associated with a global maximizer.
However, as the discussion in 3.6 will show, J also includes the excess value
for agents already born at t = 0 starting with h(0) > 0, which is not
comprised in the multiplier µ.22
3.6 Vintage productivities
Thinking along the lines of the planner’s problem also proves useful in assess-
ing vintage productivities. First, note that we can decompose the planner’s
criterion by integrating over the single agents’ values:
J =
w(T, 0)
β + δ − γ
+
∫
τ,h
Λ(τ, h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ¯
+
∫ ∞
0
e−(β−γ)tδ
w(T, 0)
β + δ − γ
dt =
w(T, 0)
β − γ
+ Λ¯
where the first equality decomposes the value for the measure one of agents
alive at t = 0 according to V = W + Λ and uses the fact that Λ = 0 for all
agents born later. We can juxtapose this and the decomposition of J into
21A stationary point is defined as a point where the Frechet-derivative is zero in all
directions, see Luenberger (1973) — this is the equivalent to the Jacobian being zero in
R
n.
22In numerical exercises, however, enforcing T < T ∗ always led to an increasing wage
structure at T which is not compatible with a CE according to lemma 2.6.
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production and promotion costs:
Y − C = (β − γ)J = w(T, 0) + (β − γ)Λ¯,
where we write Y = Y (0) and C = C(0). Since Λ¯ ≥ 0 and C ≥ 0, this
equation says that labor productivity in the last vintage w(T, 0) is lower
than average labor productivity Y in the overall economy. Furthermore, it
gives us upper bounds for both C and Λ that can be empirically assessed
by just observing productivity in dying vintages and average productivity
in the economy.
4 Calibration
For the calibration, I choose the CES aggregator defined in (1) for the
production function and the quadratic specification c(h˙) = c¯max{h˙, 0}2/2
for the cost of human-capital accumulation. Finding a competitive equi-
librium amounts to solving the system of PDEs and integral equations
consisting of the agent’s HJB (2) and FOC (3) with boundary conditions
V (T ∗, h) = V (τ, 0) = W for all h and all τ , the PDE (6) (which describes
the evolution of n) and the following wage equation:23
w(τ, h) = e−γτf(h)
(
Y˜ (τ)
n(τ, h)
)1−ρ
(17)
I propose a solution algorithm which uses a discretization scheme as
in standard lattice methods and attacks the problem of endogeneity of the
boundary values with an algorithm inspired by the way a real economy might
oscillate around a steady state when some inertia is present. Kredler (2008)
provides the complete documentation.
The model is calibrated to yearly data. The death rate δ is set to 0.025
to match an expected labor-market participation of 40 years for a 20-year
old24; β is set to 0.015 to obtain a standard yearly discount rate of β + δ =
0.04. A parsimonious functional form is assumed for returns to experience:
23Note that this system is non-standard in the following respects: First, wages are
determined non-locally; they depend not only on the density in the immediate (τ, h)-
neighborhood of the agent but also on h-levels in the same vintage that are far away from
the agent. Second, we are dealing with a system where the boundary condition W¯ is
unknown.
24I take the expected retirement age of 60 years for Germans from the German associ-
ation of retirement insurers, see www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de.
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f(h) = A+ ah, where A = 1 is chosen as a normalization.25 The remaining
parameters c¯ = 5, γ = 0.008 and a = 1 are chosen to match the experience
premium, the dispersion of earnings and the peak of the median age-earnings
profile.
4.1 Equilibrium properties
Figure 2 is a summary of the results. The career lines in the upper-left
panel show that agents in young vintages make the hardest efforts to climb
the skill hierarchy. This is in line with value differentials in the hierarchy
being highest in these vintages, as the value function in the lower-left panel
shows. The lower-right panel illustrates that wage compression is a process
that happens all the way from the newest to the oldest vintages; the skill
premium is highest in the youngest vintages and continuously shrinks as the
vintage ages. The density function in the upper-right panel is in line with
wages: Workers with high experience in young technologies are the scarcest
factor in the economy, whereas for old vintages skill scarcity vanishes as
more and more workers press up in the skill hierarchy from below.
Figure 3 shows more variables of interest. In the upper-right panel, we
see that entry into vintages is hump-shaped and strictly greater than zero
even for the oldest vintages.26 As apparent in figure 2, late entrants are
compensated for learning the least useful skills by the highest entry wages
in the economy. The upper-left panel illustrates that despite positive entry,
total employment is decreasing in vintage age in the end because incumbent
workers die at a faster rate than entrants replace them.
The lower-right panel in figure 3 illustrates labor productivity by vintage
age. The pattern is reminiscent of the hump-shaped, back-loaded return pro-
files that are typical for organization-capital models like Atkeson & Kehoe
(2005). Young vintages are unproductive because they have a very unbal-
anced mix of labor inputs; marginal returns to the different skill levels are
far from equalized since high-skill labor is very scarce. In older vintages,
joint learning leads to gradual equalization of skill returns. However, these
returns wear off over time and the negative TFP effect eventually dominates,
as predicted in section 3.6.
25To see that this is indeed a normalization, consider a model where the parameters A,
a and c¯ are each divided by A. Since production is CRS, output and wages are all divided
by A for a fixed allocation n. The same is true for the cost of human-capital accumulation.
Thus agents will choose the same quantities in both allocations.
26A straightforward calculation shows that the entry density is m(τ ) = n(τ, 0)/h˙(τ, 0).
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4.2 Age-earnings profiles
Figure 4 shows age-earnings profiles, following a cohort of labor-market en-
trants over time as they accumulate human capital in their respective vin-
tage. The curve that extends farthest to the right refers to workers who
enter the frontier technology; the shorter the curves become, the later the
respective workers enter the vintage.
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Figure 4: Age-earnings profiles over career
To understand the forces at work in these profiles, it is useful to de-
compose the growth of log-wages into its different components. Consider
infinitesimal changes in log-wage along a career [h(t), τ(t)] using (17):
d lnw
dt
∣∣∣∣∣
τ(t),h(t)
= h˙(τ, h)
f ′(h)
f(h)
+ (1− ρ)
(
∂ ln Y˜ (τ)
∂τ
−
d lnn[τ(t), h(t)]
dt
)
.
The three terms have a clear economic intuition: I term them (from left to
right) the experience effect, the organization-capital effect and the obsoles-
cence effect. The latter two can be combined into a relative-supply effect.
The experience effect captures returns from learning; it is the only effect
that is present when skills are perfect substitutes (ρ = 1). In the calibration
illustrated in figure 2, we see that human-capital accumulation h˙ is always
positive but decreasing over all careers. Since the learning function f was
assumed to be concave and h˙ decreases over a career, this means that this
effect is always positive but wears off over the career.
The innovation in the model presented here with respect to the models
in the literature lies in the terms that are switched on when lowering ρ
28
below one. These are stemming from relative factor supply. The second
term involving production Y˜ (τ) is always increasing; it represents the gains
from joint learning and the equalization of factor returns, which grow as the
vintage ages. I call this term the organization-capital effect.
Finally, the obsolescence effect (which involves the density n evaluated
along the career path) is key for understanding why earnings profiles are
decreasing for most workers towards the end of their careers. As a vintage
ages and more agents enter it, skills that were once scarce become more
abundant as workers from the lower ranks are acquiring higher skills. A
real-world example for this might be an HTML-programmer whose skills
commanded high returns when the Internet was in its infancy but saw his
wages dwindle as more and more other programmers learned HTML and his
knowledge became less scarce.
An interesting feature of the wage profiles generated by the model is that
they have heterogeneous slopes and curvature. In Ben-Porath-type models,
heterogeneity in shape is usually attained by assuming heterogeneous learn-
ing ability, see for example Guvenen & Kuruscu (2007) and Huggett et al.
(2006). In contrast to these models, agents are ex-ante equal here and all
heterogeneity is endogenous. In fact, heterogeneity in earnings profiles is
essential in order to give workers the incentives to enter any career.
Another topic from the labor literature addressed by the model is “over-
taking”. Hause (1981) defines overtaking as the fact that two wage profiles
with different slope but the same present value have to intersect at a cer-
tain point. The model has precise predictions on when this overtaking point
occurs for different pairs of agents in the economy. This effect induces the
strong negative correlation between earnings levels and earnings growth that
is present in the data for young workers (see Kredler, 2008).
4.3 Varying γ
Figures 5 and 6 show calibrations (blue lines) for 1975-1980 and 1995-2000
and contrast them with the data (grey boxplots). The calibration parame-
ters for 1975 are those described in section 4.1.27 For the period 1995-2000,
27A constant was added to the growth rates in figure 6 to obtain the best possible fit in
both the 1975-1980 and the 1995-2000 periods. As argued in section 1, fitting this quantity
is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, to obtain predictions for the earnings profile over
the entire life cycle, it is necessary to make an assumption as to what happens to workers
who are laid off when exiting the last vintage T ∗. Since in the model the assignment of
laid-off workers to new careers is indeterminate, I assume that they are randomly spread
over entry points according to the equilibrium entry density.
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I increase γ to 0.015 in order to match the observed hike in the experience
premium. This decreases the maximal vintage age T ∗ from 48 to 34 years.
Figure 5 shows that the model does a good job matching the age-earnings
profiles in the cross section. The rise in the experience premium occurs due
to the mechanism explained in section 2.4. Earnings dispersion increases
for the young because a greater fraction of them enters new technologies
in which very low entry wages are paid; it rises for the old because more
of them face their skills becoming obsolete when vintages are phased out
sooner. In figure 6, it is apparent that the model generates an increase in
earnings turbulence but that it over-predicts both its level (especially for
old workers) and its increase.28
28The high turbulence for the old is induced by the perpetual-youth assumption. Since
a laid-off 50-year-old has the same prospects as a 20-year-old in the model, he is just as
likely to enter a new vintage as a young worker. A vintage change entails large earnings
losses and large subsequent earnings growth, explaining the patterns in the right panel in
figure 6. In reality, of course, due to his shorter planning horizon, an old worker would
rather settle for an older technology with a less back-loaded earnings profile. Also, it
can be argued that the boxplots in figure 6 understate the true earnings risk faced by
German workers since the data does not include workers going into unemployment; this is
especially true for old workers for which large flows into unemployment have taken place
in Germany in the late 1990s. In this sense, the extreme predictions for old workers’
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5 Conclusions
This paper has argued that accelerated technological change can explain
both an increase in the experience premium and a rise in earnings turbulence
and dispersion when human capital is technology-specific and different skill
levels are complementary in production. In the model, the skill premium is
highest in young technologies. Skills are scarcest in these technologies since
fast accumulation of human capital is costly. In the wake of a technological
acceleration, the life span of technologies shortens and more weight is put on
new technologies; the average skill premium rises and so does the experience
premium.
A further application of the proposed framework is the analysis of the ef-
fect that a varying demographic structure has on age-earnings profiles. The
entry of a large cohort into the model economy would lead to a crowding
of entry positions and thus a reduction in entry wages. This negative effect
would likely persist as the cohort moves through the ranks of the skill hier-
archy. The result would be a negative cohort effect as is often estimated in
the labor literature.
earnings losses are less problematic.
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Another obvious testing ground for the theoretical framework is sug-
gested by its stark predictions on the experience-earnings structure condi-
tional on the age of technology. An encouraging start is that in the German
IABS data, the returns to tenure are highest for the youngest and fastest-
growing establishments (see Kredler, 2008).29 However, the model lacks a
clear mapping from its vintages to establishments or firms, making it hard
to derive precise predictions. An extension of the model in the style that
Klette & Kortum (2004) build upon Grossman & Helpman’s (1991) growth
model would be necessary for a rigorous treatment of this issue.
A further point that has only been touched upon in the previous dis-
cussion is the productivity profile of a vintage over time (see figure 3). It
displays the typical back-loaded shape that is often posited in an ad-hoc
fashion for organization capital (see Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005, for example).
In fact, the model presented here can be construed as a micro-foundation
for the way an organization increases its productivity over time and how it
shares these productivity gains among its members.
Finally, a stochastic component could be introduced into the framework
in order address the question of riskiness of human capital and technology
choice for an individual.
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A Additional proofs
A.1 Proofs on the competitive equilibrium
A.1.1 Bounded resources
Lemma A.1. (Bounded resources) There is a uniform bound y¯ <∞ on Y˜ (n),
∫
n ≤
1. Thus, resources in the economy are bounded for each fixed t.
Proof. Since Y˜ is weakly concave and takes finite values on the unit simplex ∆ =
{n :
∫
n = 1}, it is impossible that there is a sequence nk such that Y˜ (nk) grows
unbounded. To see this, take an interior point n ∈ ∆ and observe that Y˜ (n)
eventually lies below the ray between (nk, Y˜ (nk)) and some point in a ball around n.
A.1.2 Proof of lemma 2.3
Proof. Y (τ¯ ) > 0 implies that some open ball Bǫ(τ¯ , h¯) lies in the support of n for
some h¯ ∈ (0, 1). If there was some h′ such that (τ¯ , h′) did not lie in the closure
of n’s support, then there would be a ball Bǫ′(τ¯ , h
′) with ǫ′ ≤ ǫ in which wages
must be infinity — if not, firms should optimally choose to employ some workers
there. But then, any career segment passing through Bǫ′(τ¯ , h
′) would yield infinite
wages yet could be reached with a finite cost, implying thatW =∞. This is clearly
impossible since resources in the economy are bounded, see lemma A.1.
A.1.3 Proof of lemma 2.9
Proof. Suppose that the paths crossed again and denote by s the first crossing
point, i.e. s = maxu<t{u : h(u) ≤ g(u)}. Together with h(t) ≥ g(t) this implies
h(t)− h(s) ≥ g(t)− g(s)⇒
∫ t
s
h˙(u)du ≥
∫ t
s
g˙(u)du, (18)
i.e. h must grow by at least as much as g over the interval to end up above. By the
assumption on the wage function, wh(h) is a decreasing function in h. Using the
FOC (3), this implies that for all s < u < t, we have
c′
[
h˙(u)
]
=
∫ t
u
e−βvwh[h(v)]dv + e
−β˜(t−u)c′
[
h˙(t)
]
<
<
∫ t
u
e−β˜vwh[g(v)] + e
−β˜(t−u)c′
[
g˙(t)
]
= c′
[
g˙(u)
]
since by assumption h˙(t) < g˙(t) and wh[h(v)] ≤ wh[g(v)] point-wise; the inequality
follows from c′ being increasing. This again implies h˙(u) < g˙(u) for all u, which in
turn contradicts (18).
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A.1.4 Proof of lemma 2.12
Proof. First, I show that the cost C(∆h,∆t) of accumulating human capital ∆h in
a time interval ∆t goes to infinity for fixed ∆h when letting ∆t → 0. By Jensen’s
inequality, the minimal cost of accumulating ∆h within ∆t is by setting a constant
h˙ = ∆h/∆t throughout ∆t. Then C(∆h,∆t) ≥ c(∆h/∆t)∆t → ∞ if ∆t → 0 by
our assumption on c(·).
By lemma 2.7, Sn must be a rectangle (T0, T
∗) × [0, 1]. Now, suppose there
was no singularity for w in the upper left corner and w(T0, 1) < ∞. Then, by
continuity of w, for each ǫ there is a ball Bδ(T0, 1) in which wages deviate not more
than ǫ from w(T0, 1). So the parts of any career segment contained in Bδ(T0, 1)
yield bounded wage payments. But we can definitely find a sequence of careers for
which learning costs inside the ball exceed any bound. To see this, set ∆h = δ, take
a sequence ∆τ → T0 and note that the cost of reaching (T0 +∆τ, 1) inside B must
go to infinity. Note also that a positive measure of workers must take such paths
since no region is empty by lemma 2.3. But then, those workers cannot behave
optimally and should change their h-path through the ball B, which is inconsistent
with equilibrium.
This also implies that T0 = 0. If this was not the case, then workers with
careers in Bδ(T0, 1) should reach those by choosing flatter careers entering at τ = 0,
which would imply that those careers could achieve unbounded value by the above
argumentation. This contradicts W <∞.
A.2 Planner’s cost-minimizing promotion strategy
Lemma A.2. (No-crossing measure is optimal) For a given density n(t, s, h), it is
optimal for the planner not to let career paths cross when implementing the density.
This means that the planner makes workers follow paths h(t+u) for any given t, any
vintage s and any u ∈ (0, T−t) such that N [t+u, s, h(t+u)] = exp(−δu)N [t, s, h(t)].
Proof. I will proceed constructively to engineer the optimal measure on life paths by
a discrete approximation procedure. Cut time and vintages into intervals of length
2−kT ∗ for k = 1, 2, . . . to get grids {t
(k)
i }
∞
i=1 and {s
(k)
i }
Ns
i=1. For human capital, cut
such that the points {h
(k)
i }
Ns
i=1 yield intervals of length 2
−k. Approximate every path
by connecting the middle of the interval it passes through at ti for t = 0, 2
−k, . . .
with straight lines. For every given measure µ on lives, summing up the costs over
all possible combinations weighted by the densities induced by the measure µ gives
us an approximation Ck(µ) for the total cost of human-capital accumulation for
this µ.
Now, we will construct a lower bound C∗k on this cost for a fixed iteration k
in the algorithm. Note that it is enough to consider the task of moving workers
between ti and ti+1 for each point in time. It does not matter how we combine
these path segments sequentially, any combination must yield the same value.
Without loss of generality, consider the case k = 1 for t1 = 0 and t2 = 1 for the
vintage s = 1 (note that the case for s = 0 is trivial). The claim is that it cannot be
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optimal to choose a promotion scheme under which the paths of a positive measure
of agents cross. Suppose we chose a promotion scheme under which a positive
measure of agents crossed, i.e. a measure ǫ¯ went from h¯0 to h1 and a measure
ǫ > 0 from h0 to h¯1, where all the mentioned h-levels are center points of the
approximation grid, and where h¯j > hj . Now, set ǫ
′ = min{ǫ, ǫ¯} and consider the
alternative of moving ǫ′ agents from h¯0 to h¯1 and the measure ǫ
′ from h0 to h1. This
would dominate the original allocation because of the following argument: Take z
to be the intersection of the lines h¯0 to h1 and h0 to h¯1. Then, clearly the process
of sending everybody to z but then exchanging the flows to keep workers positions
in the hierarchy fixed is just as cheap as the original policy. However, notice that
this new policy must be weakly inferior to sending workers on the direct line h¯0 to
h¯1 and h0 to h1, since this is the cost-minimizing strategy by Jensen’s inequality.
Also, notice that there always exists a policy which does not make any worker
flows cross: First, fill the uppermost interval at t = 1 with the uppermost workers
from t = 0; proceed by filling the second interval with the uppermost workers left at
t = 0 after the first step, and so forth. It is also clear that any process that does not
follow these rules must make some workers cross and that any such process can be
rendered by a finite number of improving operations into the proposed no-crossing
algorithm; this shows that the no-crossing mechanism is optimal for a fixed k.
Obviously, the values C∗k converge to the value of implementing the no-crossing
measure µnc. Now, observe that no other measure µ
′ can yield a cost strictly
lower than this — if we approximate µ by the above scheme, we obtain C(µ′) =
limk→∞ Ck(µ
′) ≥ limk→∞ C
∗
k = C
∗.
It remains to prove that the lines of the no-crossing measure follow the proposed
law. By the algorithm above, it is clear that an agent who had N(0, 1, h) workers
above himself in the career and survives until t = 1 will have exp(−1δ)N(0, 1, h)
workers above himself at t = 1, which is the second claim of the statement. The
arguments above obviously generalize to any t, s and t+ u.
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